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Abstract 
 
 
 
Drawing inspiration from the loosely coupled genre of studies of governmentality, 
this paper explores the emergence in Britain during the early years of the millennium 
of a distinctive liberal conservative scheme for the government of civil servants. The 
term ‘boardization’ has been used to characterise the trend to reproduce the 
technology of the board of directors in central government. Conservatives currently 
assign a distinctive role to the work of departmental ‘boards’ in the effective 
management of the Civil Service. Intimating the costs and risks of the Conservatives’ 
programme, we explore  the role of diverse governmental forces in the emergence of 
the boards of the Civil Service as an object for action and intervention during the 
early years of the new millennium. We  explore a mutation in the application of 
practices and techniques drawn from the domain of the business enterprise to the 
organization of the Civil Service.  
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Introduction 
Changes in administrative practice in the British Civil Service in the years of the 
Conservative governments of the 1980s and 1990s are commonly associated with a certain 
consistency of style, a manifestation of the loosely coupled regime of administration that 
came to be known as ‘the new public management’ (Hood, 1991).  From the early 1980s, 
with the aim of enhancing efficiency and curtailing the expansionary tendencies of 
bureaucracy (Niskanen, 1973), British civil servants were made responsible for budgets 
and accountable for the achievement of performance objectives in new ways. An array of 
economy measures were pursued. The reforms of the later 1980s and 1990s introduced 
agency arrangements to the Civil Service, new customer charters and simulated market 
mechanisms. Expectations of the qualities of the bureaucrat altered during these years as 
politicians affirmed the virtues of enterprise, responsibility and initiative. However, by the 
turn of the millennium British Conservatives  were offering seemingly new prescriptions 
for the management  of civil servants. This paper considers the work of diverse groups, 
directly and indirectly connected with the Conservatives, in developing a particular 
approach to the management of the British Civil Service during the early years of the new 
millennium. In June 2010 the Minister with responsibility for the Cabinet Office 
announced the former Chief Executive of BP Lord Browne as the Government’s lead non 
executive director (Cabinet Office, 2010). Browne, it was said, would assist in making the 
centre of British government work in a ‘business like’ way, in improving the ‘governance’ 
of the Civil Service and, most especially, the working of ‘departmental boards’(Cabinet 
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Office, 2010). This discussion explores the emergence of the technology of ‘the board’ as a 
key target for action for the Conservatives during the years between 2001 – 2009.  
 
We locate Conservative interest in the boards of the Civil Service in the context of the 
development of a broader rationality of government fashioned by an array of experts and 
authorities. During the early years of the millennium a discourse with a distinctive, 
reflexive and critical perspective on the management of the Civil Service began to take 
shape. Conservatives and their allies imagined a new era of ‘modern management’ in the 
Civil Service taking issue with what they judged to be glib and ineffective in the 
management schemes of their opponents. Yet ‘modern management’ would not entail a 
break with the managerial concerns of the New Public Management (NPM). Rather, we 
are concerned with a mutation in thinking about the deployment of  management  practices 
in the Civil Service. Conservatives desired an array of management reforms. There were, 
for example, to be more effective forms of rewarding operational excellence, of dealing 
with the ‘poor performer’ and deploying the skills of civil servants. But, above all perhaps, 
the departmental board became the central target for intervention  for  an alliance of 
influential political forces during these years.   
 
Inspired by those who have drawn on the later Foucault (1982; 1991) working in the field 
of studies of governmentality, the concern is to reflect historically and critically on this 
scheme for the government of civil servants. Critics (Hood, 1991; Pollitt, 1993; du Gay, 
2000) of  earlier Conservative reforms in the Civil Service raised an array of criticism of 
the perverse effects and dangers of the ‘lionisation’ (Fournier and Grey, 2000) of 
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management in that era. In turn we raise the question of the costs of a new era of 
Conservative reform. To what extent have Conservatives transcended the difficulties of an 
earlier era of management reform in the Civil Service ? We explore these developments 
against a background of shifting political and economic conditions during the first decade 
of the new millennium. If by 2009 a set of ideas concerning the role of the departmental 
board in the government of civil servants had acquired a certain coherence, an array of 
separate historical developments must be understood. On the one hand, we are concerned 
with critiques and arguments over the problem of the Civil Service during the early years 
of the new millennium and the rise of the very idea of ‘modern management’. On the other 
hand, we are concerned with the emergence of the departmental board as a target for 
political debate, action and intervention. Diverse governmental forces -  at work both 
inside and outside the formal political process  - debated the condition of the Civil Service 
during these years, problematising the ‘strategic’ capabilities and leadership of 
departments and calling their ‘governance’ arrangements into question. The term 
‘boardization’ was coined to characterise a trend to reproduce the technology of the board 
of directors in central government (Wilkes, 2007). Though distancing themselves from 
their regime of targets, surveillance and control from the centre, Conservatives would take 
much from the schemes and experiences of their political opponents. Conservative thought, 
as we will see, was informed by this debate as the boards of departments emerged as 
decisive targets for action and intervention for an alliance of political forces  
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On the perspective of governmentality 
The loosely coupled genre of studies of governmentality (Dean, 1999; Miller and Rose, 
1990; Miller and Rose, 2008; Rose, 1999) has provided a number of insightful, historically 
informed analyses of relevance to organization and management studies. At an abstract 
level, such studies are concerned with the more calculated forms of the exercise of power, 
highlighting the diversity of powers and governing authorities which seek to regulate the 
subject’s space of freedom. Evoking an early modern usage, the word ‘governing’ relates 
to any attempt to shape or mould the conduct of others (Foucault, 1982; Rose, 1999).  
Interest turns to the discursive character of ‘rule’, the language  that authorities and experts 
use to imagine and define the subjects they aspire to govern, as well as the technical 
methods of influence and inscription that they put to work (Foucault, 1982). Government 
is conceived at once as a linguistic or discursive and ‘technological’ activity to the extent 
that it relies on instruments and technical procedures in relation to the targets of its 
intervention. The problem of government breaks down into an analysis of the concepts, 
arguments and procedures by which ‘rule’ comes to be enacted. Activities of government  
and modes of knowledge are understood  to interconnect in diverse ways. Governing 
always  relies on a certain framing of objectives or a certain manner of reasoning. Practices 
which monitor, inscribe and record the activity of the governed facilitate the activity of 
those who rule. A distinctive feature of contemporary liberal regimes of government is the 
proliferation of modes of expert knowledge. An array of experts, laying claim to 
knowledgeable, neutral and efficacious competence, pass judgement on diverse 
governmental questions.  
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Less an attempt to apply Foucault as to work creatively with his thought and methods of 
working, systematic expositions of the genre suggest a form of analysis that embraces both 
the historical and systematizing dimensions of genealogical critique. Studies of 
governmentality seek to capture not only the overall logic of  the games of truth or 
rationalities of a decentred political field, but also the process by which they took shape. 
Historically informed enquiry seeks to reveal the contingencies by which the present was 
formed. Games of truth are shown to have been different to those to which we are 
accustomed  (Rose, 1999). Studies of governmentality therefore aim to enhance our 
awareness that what we are is not given or inevitable, thereby enhancing the contestability 
of the present moment.   
 
Studies of governmentality have been especially concerned to shed light on the shifting 
rationalities for the government of work. Influential early work highlighted the 
transformations associated with the emergence of a so called neo liberal or advanced 
liberal rationality in Britain with the ascendancy of the New Right from the late 1970’s 
(Miller and Rose, 1990; du Gay, 1996). Foregrounding revisions to management thought 
and technologies in the context of the changing aims of the State, analysts of 
governmentality shed light on the part which multiple agencies of government -  an array 
of experts, a loose alliance of consultants, business academics, gurus and agencies 
connected to the state -  played in forging apparently new ways of imagining and acting on 
the productive subject at work. The key leitmotif became that of enterprise and self 
responsibility: the cultivation of such qualities in bureaucrats, managers, indeed all citizens 
became the aim of an array of governing agencies. 
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Yet critics have raised a number of problems with the genre which seem to require some 
re-thinking. There has been significant critical commentary on the alleged shortcomings of 
the genre from without, often with a strongly anti – Foucauldian flavour (eg Armstrong, 
2001; Kerr, 1999). But those seeking to develop the genre also highlight an array of 
limitations (Barratt, 2008; McKinlay, 2010; McKinlay et al, 2010; O’Malley et al, 1997). 
In part the challenge is  to a common reliance on, and consequent overvaluation of, official 
textual sources and programmes. There is a need to move beyond the study of texts of rule, 
to an exploration of the practical dynamics of government at an organisational level. For 
the analysts of governmentality, it has been argued, the possibilities of exploring the 
manner in which broad concepts are translated into practices on the ground remains largely 
uncharted (McKinlay et al, 2010). Instances of the genre incline, it has been claimed 
(O’Malley et al, 1997), towards excessive generalisation. Excessive attention is given to 
the characterisation of abstract and general rationalities of government: especially neo 
liberal and advanced liberal regimes of government. As one commentator puts it: ‘the 
seductive appeal of the ‘aerial’ view of the world seems to win out over careful research 
into the local and partial, with the consequence that the analytics and concepts of 
government are draw back into the ambit of a refashioned grand theory’ (Walters, 2012, 
p.114). Concepts, classifications, instruments and procedures of government have a 
complex history which historical analysis should seek to unravel at a level of detail often 
claimed to be untypical of the genre (O’Malley, et al, 1997; McKinlay, 2010; McKinlay et 
al, 2010).  Greater attention needs to be given to the struggles out of which ideas and 
practices were born and the complex and contingent process by which they took shape. 
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Studies of governmentality not uncommonly render  historical events without reference to 
individual or collective agents (McKinlay et al, 2010, Walters, 2012), suggesting an 
implausible ‘anonymity’ in their analyses. Sympathetic critics  point also to a tendency 
towards the avoidance of critique.  There is a diagnostic element, present in Foucault 
(O’Malley et al, 1997), that is frequently absent in the genre.   
 
Responding to the criticisms we have been considering, we offer here one, provisional way 
of framing  how the genre might be usefully extended, recognising that that there will 
always be other interpretations and that stated positions should always be left open to the 
possibility of later revision. Seeking to reform rather than to interrupt, the adjustments  we 
suggest here give particular emphasis to the nominalist and contingent character of 
genealogical inquiry (Bevir, 2010; O’Malley, 1997; Walters, 2012). Reflecting our 
nominalist concerns, the aim is to restore an attention to the specificity of  practices of 
governing subjects in particular institutional settings, focusing on the emergence of a 
distinctive rationality for the government of civil servants and, most especially, a particular 
technology designed to give effect to  a set of ideals. If those in party political circles who 
aspire to govern frame their ends in a certain way and come to view the boards of the Civil 
Service as a privileged mechanism for the realisation of those ends, the aim ultimately is to 
reveal the diverse relations and processes by which such  a way of thinking  came to be 
assembled (Dean, 1999, p.31). We assume, like Dean and Hindess (1998), that analysis 
should begin with the moment of problematisation: how a certain way of governing 
conduct was called into question in a definite social setting. We assume also, that the aim 
of the genealogist is to develop ‘compelling narratives’ (Bevir, 2010, p.430), tracing the 
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history and consequences of modes of belief and action, ‘grey and meticulous’ in their 
orientation to truth (Foucault, 2000). 
 
We seek, then, to reveal the connections, encounters and plays of forces  that leads, at a 
given moment, to a particular manner of conceiving how civil servants should be governed 
(Dean, 1999). A nominalist interest in historical particularity is matched by a concern to 
capture the element of chance and uncertainty in the emergence of a particular order of 
truth, with such contingency arising from various conditions. We assume that historical 
actors depend on prior frameworks of thought for the manner in which they reason and act. 
But, after Nietzsche (2008), the ideas of the past can always be interpreted anew or 
redirected to new ends. As Bevir argues, change occurs contingently as people ‘interpret, 
modify or transform an inherited tradition in response to novel circumstances or other 
dilemmas’ (Bevir, 2010, p.426). We are similarly indebted to a Nietzschean radical 
historicism (Bevir, 2010) in foregrounding the element of struggle, contestation and the 
suppression of alternatives in the emergence of a particular scheme of rule. Attention turns, 
in our case, to the role of disparate political factions and  expert voices and the alliances 
and tactics they pursue against a background of the uncertain  struggle for advantage in a 
liberal democratic polity. 
  
We assume also that the aim of an ‘historian of the present’ (Foucault, 1977) is to ground 
substantive investigation clearly in what the critic judges to be the problems of a particular 
historical time. History becomes a resource for dissipating the present, enumerating costs 
and risks  and inciting others to acts of political reinvention  (Dean, 1999). It is especially  
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by revealing the fragile processes of the emergence and construction of present forms of 
rule that the study of governmentality seeks to achieve its ethico – political aims. No 
longer must we view certain forms of thought and action as necessary or inevitable.  
Accordingly, it is to the examination of an array of think tank publications, government 
‘White Papers’, research reports prepared by the officers of government, speeches of 
prominent politicians, as well as relevant secondary sources  that we now turn in an effort 
to capture the slow emergence of a singular game of truth.  
 
Liberal conservatism and the critique of ‘micromanagement’  
For the moment of ‘problematisation’ in the emergence of the scheme of government with 
which we are concerned, we should look to debates among Conservatives at the turn of the 
millennium. For these critics, as we will see, at the heart of the errors and mistakes of their 
opponents in respect of the Civil Service lay a basic deficiency in administrative style. 
Arguments  about the need to rethink the organisation of the public sector in Conservative 
circles first began to emerge in the aftermath of the electoral defeat of 1997. Conservatives, 
it was argued, had failed to invest adequately in essential services and had become 
associated with hostility to public servants. The new leadership  argued the case for change 
only to be forced to retreat by opponents on the right (Bale, 2011). Yet by the turn of the 
millennium new voices from outside the hierarchy were beginning to raise the problem of 
the public services once again (Cooper, 2001). 
 
Conservative ‘modernisers’ took as their part of departure certain distinctive features of  
the administrative style of their opponents. Tony Blair imagined himself as the Chief 
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Executive Officer of a major enterprise, setting a coherent and ‘joined up’ policy direction, 
seeing that direction was followed through at the level of the departments of government 
and that outcomes were effectively measured (Blair, 2010, p. 338). ‘Public Service 
Agreements’ were applied to the departments of government by the Treasury, including 
outcome and process requirements. A key aim was to improve the responsiveness of 
departments to political goals, particularly in respect of the promotion of quality and 
choice in the delivery of public services. Performance management became a crucial 
management technology during these years.  
 
But for Conservative ‘modernisers’ at the turn of the millennium, such elements of the 
favoured administrative style of their opponents constituted a substantial weakness. A 
decisive contribution emerged from a new think tank: Policy Exchange, formed in 2001, 
with the aim of furnishing ideas that would help to fashion a genuinely ‘modern’ 
conservatism. The first contribution of the group that lead the new think tank in its early 
years came in the form of an edited collection, including discussion of new directions for 
the organization of public services (Vaizey, et al, 2001). There was no common view  
uniting all contributors to this collection. For the editors, however, the aim should not be to 
look back to an earlier political era. On the organization of the economy the Conservatives 
had won the argument with their opponents. The vital political questions of the moment 
lay elsewhere: public service provision and the effects of social change. At the heart of the 
errors and mistakes of their opponents lay a basic deficiency in administrative style: a faith 
in design and an obsession with ‘micromanagement’. No longer were civil servants simply 
utility maximising agents with a dangerous inclination to expand their  responsibilities and 
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budgets for personal gain, as understood by the theorists of public choice (Niskanen, 1973). 
Rather, the central problem lay, as these conservative intellectuals saw it, in the application 
of an alien and ineffective theoretical model of management: an approach that stifled the 
wisdom and initiative of the civil servant. Planning systems of this type, it was believed,  
had the further effect of restricting the diversity of provision. Government departments of 
any size were inevitably too complex to run from the political centre (Boles, 2001). There 
was an acknowledgement of the complicity of the Conservatives of the 1980s and 1990s in 
this state of affairs, but the party’s opponents had greatly extended the  managerial systems 
initiated during those years. ‘New Labour’ betrayed an instinctive socialist ‘will to control’, 
leaving the public servant at the mercy of  the centre of government and its control regime. 
The regime of process targets set and monitored, augmented by systems of audit, had 
demoralised the majority of civil servants, depriving them of the means of exercising their 
‘professional judgement’.  Good government, the editors argued, set limits to its own 
power and showed greater respect for the knowledge and ‘professionalism’ of  the public 
servant and the ideas, talent and innovation present in all citizens. The editors prescribed 
no specific solution to the critique they developed. Rather, they gestured towards a future 
political debate. Whatever path would  be chosen by the Conservatives, it was assumed 
that both party members and public sector professionals should play an active role in its 
development. The sense of a need for new measures to address new times was thus 
strongly cued in the arguments of these Conservative intellectuals writing at the turn of the 
millennium, as they sought to reposition their party in the struggle for party political 
advantage.  
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During the early years of  its existence, there were conscious efforts to promote their 
arguments and critiques by members of the new think tank. Particular effort appears to 
have been directed at the Party’s grassroots at fringe events and road – shows (Snowden, 
2010). Consistent  with the typical modus operandi of the  modern think tank: that of the 
mediator Osborne (2004), the aim was to occupy a position in a network of political actors. 
Alliances were forged with  sympathetic forces emerging in the early years of the new 
millennium. In the political circles around the new leadership after 2001, there were  forces 
at work with much in common with the  analysts of Policy Exchange. Articulated in the 
paternalistic language of ‘one nation conservatism’, their concerns were with the condition 
of the poor and the erosion of social bonds (Duncan Smith et al, 2002). It would be 
through the action of ‘civil society’ that the ills of society would be cured. Yet here again, 
the problems of governing civil servants were framed in a similar way. Not only did 
welfare provision foster dependency in the poor and inhibit the philanthropic instincts of 
citizens, the necessary incompetence of bureaucrats in  the administrative centre 
contributed to an array of social problems.   
 
At the same time, Conservative researchers wrote of ‘New Labour’s’ command state, of 
management processes that constituted a ‘deluge of interference’ in the operations of front 
line public servants (Clark and Mather, 2003, p. 2 ). Professional and provider institutions 
should be trusted to get on with their work in a decentralised public service regime, where 
the principles of choice or democratic control should prevail. Others wrote of a ‘rationalist 
fallacy’ embodied in the management schemes of the British Treasury (Jenkins, 2004, 
p.22). 
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It would take  a period of several years for the arguments espoused by the  ‘modernisers’ 
of Policy Exchange and their allies to gain ground  in the Conservative hierarchy. In the 
main, members of the party remained committed to more familiar political themes. But 
during 2004, as  the party faced the prospect of further electoral defeat,  an alliance began 
to form in the political networks of west London: a select and interconnected  group of 
conservatives centred in the metropolis. Members of Policy Exchange  were drawn into an 
association with other intellectuals: agents involved in policy development at Conservative 
Central Office, including the MP and Head of Policy Coordination David Cameron and his 
associates George Osborne and Steve Hilton, as well as members of the press. This was 
not an organised movement but  a  loose alliance united above all by a concern to revisit 
the varied resources of conservative discourse to fashion new directions for the party and 
to promote their ideas in party political circles. Assisted by the continuing deterioration of 
the Conservatives’ electoral fortunes, the manoeuvring for advantage and authority in the 
party by this faction would ultimately be  successful.  
 
On more than one occasion, David Cameron (2005;  2011) has referred to Policy Exchange 
as being at the heart of a liberal conservative ‘revolution’. The themes we have been 
reviewing were certainly present in early speeches (Cameron, 2005; 2006). In 2006, for 
example, Cameron (2006) affirmed the inherent professionalism of the civil servant against 
those who were all too ready to present a mere caricature.  There was an ‘automatic and 
lazy assumption’ that standards of service among public servants were invariably poor. 
The ideologues of ‘New Labour’, as well as the forces of dogma and reaction  among the 
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Conservatives, were equally at fault in this regard. The failings of the Civil Service ‘New 
Labour’ had sought to highlight were, in reality, a reflection of their ineffective political 
schemes. It was a matter of ‘accepted common sense’ that the private sector had no 
monopoly on excellence in serving the public. Nevertheless, the full potential of public 
service professionals had still to be fully realised. Where their opponents all too readily 
preferred to ‘look over the shoulder’ of the public servant, Conservatives would trust in 
their inherent professionalism, releasing them from the grip of an ‘ineffective’ 
management regime. What was required now was a new era of ‘modern management’ in 
the public services.  
 
In the analyses and arguments of this era, then, Conservatives consistently evoked the need 
for ‘modernisation’ in respect of the organisation of the Civil Service and the public sector 
more generally. Yet for all the affirmation of  novelty, there were echoes in the arguments 
at this time of an earlier era of controversy and reconstruction on the political right. After 
the Second World War, in the context of the quickening pace of collectivism  (Green, 
2002), Conservatives engaged in a self conscious examination of their political aspirations 
and objectives. Critiques and prescriptions took a number of different forms (Gamble, 
1974; Cockett, 1995). There was, however, one particularly influential discourse: notions 
of the inherent limits of political knowledge, as contrasted with the customary knowledge 
and liberty enshrined in civil society and its institutions, structured a whole field of debate 
after the  middle years of the 1940s (White , 1950; Hogg , 1947; Oakeshott , 1947).  
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Conservative Parliamentarians and intellectuals of the 1940s and 1950s, much like the  
theorists in the early years of the millennium, were concerned to return to the resources of 
conservative discourse to fashion a response to new circumstances and problems, making 
conservatism a living doctrine in the style that Burke recommended. Edmund Burke (2004) 
bequeathed to these modern liberal conservatives a deep suspicion of the application of a 
priori schemes to political affairs. The limits of human reason and the  complexity of the 
social order, Burke argued, rendered all such schemes an inferior basis for political action. 
Government in accordance with the customs and conventions of society was to be 
preferred. Burke can of course be placed in a long line of English political theorists, 
beginning with Hooker in the late sixteenth century (Quinton, 1976). His  achievement was 
to add a distinctive liberalism to the customs and traditions of the English (Boyd,2004). 
Yet all borrowed much from the arguments of the sceptics of the Hellenistic era (Lom, 
2001), adapting arguments concerning the limits of reason and the place of custom and 
convention  in human existence for political purposes (Pocock, 1960). With the revival of 
such elements of conservative discourse in the 2000s new forms of political critique thus 
became possible directed, as we have seen, at the performance management practices of 
the administrative centre of the Civil Service. 
 
‘New Labour’ and the governance of the Civil Service 
Beyond the arguments and critiques of the Conservative ‘modernisers’, other separate 
developments in the application of ideas and practices borrowed from the domain of 
enterprise require consideration. We turn away, then, from the influence  of political theory 
to the role of  a more practical form of knowledge in the assemblage of a particular regime 
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of government. In particular, efforts to enhance the strategic capability of the Civil Service 
during the ‘New Labour’ years took a variety of different forms (Kavanagh and Richards, 
2001; Chapman and O’Toole, 2010). For ‘New Labour’ innovations in the deployment of 
management techniques and simulated market processes (Cabinet Office, 1999) under the 
Conservative leaderships of Thatcher and Major had been largely positive in their effects. 
But Conservative reforms had tended to fragment bureaucracy, exacerbating the 
characteristic ‘departmentalism’ of the bureaucrat: the tendency to promote the interests 
and customary knowledge of the department (Richards, 2007).  
 
‘New Labour’ turned increasingly to outside sources for  advice, initiating fresh, long term 
strategic thinking and seeking to coordinate the strategic decisions of departments. 
Competence dictionaries prescribing the norms of excellent performance allied to pay, 
appraisal and development practices formed a framework  within which the senior civil 
servant was expected to reconstitute him or herself as a proactive agent in the strategic 
management processes of government (Blair, 2010; Horton and Farnham, 2002). But 
efforts to promote the new strategic sensibility in the years after 2005 (Wilkes, 2007) also 
included the deployment of the technology of the ‘departmental board’. The notion that 
social practices analogous to those of the unitary board of the public limited company had 
a part to play in the organization  of the Civil Service was not a new one. The Griffiths 
Report into the National Health Service (Griffiths Report, 1983) not only argued for  a 
coherent system of management at local level. There was also the need for a more clearly 
defined ‘general management’ function in the Department. A board  of ‘executives’ and 
‘non executives’ to initiate and oversee the changes was prescribed. During the 1980s and 
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1990s, boards of a similar design emerged in a number of Civil Service departments, in ad 
hoc fashion reflecting the beliefs of particular departmental leaders rather than any wider 
political scheme. But the Treasury initiative of 2005 marked a departure (Treasury, 2005). 
Henceforward, the establishment of boards in both agencies and departments became 
effectively mandatory.  
 
‘New Labour’ (Blair, 2006) presented the boards of the departments as a necessary 
response to a set of social conditions, a mechanism for enabling the Civil Service to 
transcend an inherent conservatism and institutional inertia. The established machinery of 
government was simply unsuited to the conditions of the time. The argument evokes a 
familiar sociological inflection in the discourse of ‘New Labour’ (Finlayson, 2003). 
Advances in new technology had not only made available new options for the delivery of 
services. It had also encouraged new, more sophisticated and demanding consumers, to 
whom governments were compelled to respond (Blair, 2006, p.1). Ultimately, the 
argument relied on a fundamental binary division: the unresponsive, ill adapted and 
producer led bureaucracy of the traditional Civil Service department set against the new 
model, reconfigured department, with the departmental board at its strategic centre.   
  
Departments would therefore be managed by an ‘effective board’ supporting ministers by 
setting the department’s ‘standards and values’, ‘taking forward’ the strategic aims of the 
department, ‘taking ownership’ of the management of performance and advising on 
questions of finance and human resource management (Treasury, 2005). Boards, with 
leadership and strategic roles, had thus become  of some importance in the effort to  
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enhance the management of ‘delivery’ and performance in the Civil Service. With the 
development of interest in the boards of departments, the principles of ‘board 
responsibility’ and ‘corporate decision making’,  adapted from the norms of the unitary 
board of the public limited company as these had been coded explicitly in the years after 
the Second World War (Tiratsoo, 2004),  were effectively diffused into a new domain of 
government. Likewise the ideal of a board comprising both skilled and experienced 
executives, as well as independent non – executive members,  affirmed in numerous 
reports of the 1990s and 2000s (Cadbury, 1992; Hampel, 1998; Turnbull, 1999; Higgs, 
2003) as attempts were made to restrain the excesses of executive directors in public 
limited companies during those years, was adapted to a new setting. Non  - executives 
were enjoined to ‘support’ and ‘challenge’ their executive counterparts and to lead on 
matters of audit (Treasury, 2005). A work of ‘translation’ (Rose,1999) or  a redeployment 
of practices of government from one domain to another is suggested here. But ‘New 
Labour’ drew inspiration from developments in the domain of corporate governance 
without simply following prescription. And this would be a permissive and flexible 
scheme of government, allowing departmental heads to fashion their own optimum 
arrangements.  
 
Problematising  the boards       
In practice, progress towards the programmatic ideal for the boards was slow and faltering. 
After 2005, the requirement for effective strategic management in the departments  became 
a central concept in a wider debate. Diverse reports, relying on expert investigation and 
analysis,  opened the Civil Service up to scrutiny, comparison and judgement according to 
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a norm of strategy, placing questions of Civil Service governance and the organization of 
the boards at the heart of their analyses (Cabinet Office, 2006; Public Administration 
Select Committee, 2007; Parker et al, 2009; Parker et al, 2010). And much of the 
information and  argument presented the management and governance of departments  in a 
problematic light, falling well short of the norm.  
 
Initially, there were the Capability Reviews. Launched by the Head of the Civil Service 
(Cabinet Office, 2006), between 2006 and 2009 twenty five  reviews were conducted 
drawing on the expertise of representatives of business, the wider public sector as well as 
the Civil Service. Departments were to be examined in relation to their strategic planning, 
leadership and service delivery processes. The first group of reviews highlighted a set of 
common weaknesses. Departments, it was claimed, were deficient in finding ‘imaginative’ 
solutions in respect of the delivery of services and  in developing skills (Cabinet Office, 
2006).  By 2009, though there were claims of widespread improvements in the strategic 
capabilities of departments, the reviewers identified continuing weaknesses in respect of 
skill development and the capability to transform departmental strategies into effective 
delivery (Cabinet Office, 2009). The offices of government remained in key respects 
unreformed and  lacking in ‘strategic capability’. All of this, it was assumed, implied fresh 
challenges for the boards. 
 
Similar concerns were at the heart of the investigations of the Parliamentary Select 
Committee on Public Administration (Public Administration Select Committee, 2007). All 
manner of perverse effects flowed from the absence of an effective ‘strategic centre’ 
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(Public Administration Select Committee, 2007, p.3). In most instances, departments 
lacked adequate knowledge of the skills they required. Staff development initiatives were 
typically ‘demand led’ (Public Administration Select Committee, 2007, p.13) rather than 
guided by strategic considerations. Staff were moved too rapidly between positions with 
damaging effects on departmental capabilities. Above all, departmental leaders had failed 
to take responsibility in relation to the management of the ‘poor performer’ (Public 
Administration Select Committee, 2007, p.14). 
 
Perhaps the most critical appraisal of the  capabilities of departments emerged from the 
think tank the Institute for Government (Parker et al, 2009; Parker et al, 2010).  Drawing 
on the Capability Reviews, internal surveys and the Institute’s own research, the 
government of the  boards was once again being called into question. The Civil Service, it 
was claimed, was suffering from a lack of ‘effective strategic management’ at all levels. 
Greater ‘coherence’ of thinking was required at the highest levels of policy making. At 
departmental level, the Institute argued, the symptoms of ineffective management were 
present everywhere: the failure of the majority of departments to achieve their targets, low 
levels of staff morale and confidence in  leaders and boards, a perception of failure on the 
part of departmental leaders to address the problem of the ‘poor performer’. What was now 
required was not only a clearer definition of  roles  but a strengthening of the board (Parker 
et al, 2010, p.61). If ministerial teams and boards could be brought together in a single 
‘strategic board’ with specialists in finance involved in strategic decisions from the outset, 
the operation of departments would be enhanced (Parker et al, 2010, p.70) and the need for 
supervision and control from the centre reduced. To enhance their operation, greater 
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attention needed to be given to the competences of board members, to the enhancement of 
‘group dynamics’ and ’behavioural awareness’. Effective boards would also give greater 
attention to their non – executives: to their recruitment, induction and development (Parker 
et al, 2010, p.71). And new powers should be conferred on the non – executive, so they 
might have some say in the performance assessment of the most senior officials.  
 
Liberal Conservatism and the reinvention of the boards 
As Conservatives prepared their programmes for the management of the Civil Service 
during 2008 and 2009, arguments and critiques advanced during the early 2000s by the 
new think tanks of the time informed their analysis. There was praise for the customary 
knowledge of the bureaucrat, in the sceptical mode of the analysts of Policy Exchange. 
Conservatives, it was said, would ‘listen to’ and ‘respect’ the advice of their civil servants 
(Maude, 2009a). The civil servant would no longer be required to submit to the ‘excessive’ 
and ‘distracting’ target based regime of management favoured by ‘New Labour’. The 
knowledge present in society and its autonomous institutions, including the great 
professions, should be recognised and released. Civil servants were to be agents of  a new 
era of government subverting conventional norms of command and control in relation to 
the organisations of civil society and fostering their well – being (Conservative Party, 
2008). They were to become ‘civic servants’, granted leave of absence for participating in 
such organisations and subject to appraisal in respect of  the new civic norm.  
 
What was also clear, however, was that Conservatives, like  their opponents and the 
diverse expert voices we have been considering, had come to see the configuration of the 
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departmental board as a central target for action and intervention. Recent publications have 
highlighted the particular influence of the analyses and arguments of the Institute for 
Government, as the Conservatives prepared for office in 2009 and 2010 (Civil Service 
World, 2010). Certainly, the report ‘It’s Your Money’ (Conservative Party, 2009) prepared 
by the Shadow Minister and the head of the Implementation Unit, preparing the 
Conservatives for government, emphasized the strengthening of the role of the finance 
specialist at the highest levels of strategy making in departments, recalling the 
recommendations of the Institute. Similarly,  speeches during 2009 (Maude, 2009a; 2009b)  
took up  other familiar themes: the problems of morale, the management of the ‘poor 
performer’ and the effective nurturing of expertise. And control, as the Conservatives saw 
it, should lie with newly strengthened departmental boards, chaired by relevant ministers, 
if these challenges were now to be addressed.  
 
Yet Conservatives should not be viewed as  merely following  think tank ‘blueprints’ 
during these years. Crucially, the preeminent way of rationalising the case for 
‘modernisation’ had acquired another inflection, reflecting changes in political strategy in 
the Conservative leadership in the autumn of 2008 (Bale, 2010). The interventions of 
authorities inside the Party, rather than the think tanks, were decisive here. In the context 
of economic  recession and in the aftermath of the banking crisis, reform and enhanced 
efficiency were now judged to be essential in a new era of ‘fiscal austerity’. The cause of 
national  economic difficulties lay primarily in the costs of the State and the actions of a 
profligate and ‘irresponsible’ Government: the source  of  a burdensome deficit in the 
public finances (Conservative Party, 2009).    In the period after 1997 ‘New Labour’, it 
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was now claimed,  had resorted to type: expanding the domain of the State, borrowing 
without regard for the consequences, presiding over inefficient practices and financing 
‘extravagant’ schemes of rule (Conservative Party, 2009). Relying to a greater degree on 
the energy and wisdom of ‘civil society’ and private enterprise, would be a  significant 
source of saving in its own right. Circumstances now also demanded emergency cost 
savings. Yet the primary problem was that of obtaining ‘more for less’ from the 
administrative machinery of the central State. In place of the ‘ineffective and costly’ 
schemes for the management of civil servants favoured by their opponents, Conservatives, 
it was argued, should aim for a new culture of self sustaining efficiency, engaging the 
active and willing support of civil servants. Current and future economic stability 
demanded change in the administrative machinery.  
 
Reconfigured boards had thus become a matter of necessity, in a logic that brooked no 
argument. And, in the interests of frugal government, new ways of coding the activity of 
departmental board members were now explicitly prescribed (Maude, 2009a; 2009b). The 
technology of the ‘business plan’, initially a resource for presenting broad policy options 
to the electorate in respect of education (Haddon and Riddell, 2011), now became a 
resource in plans for the administration of the State. Henceforward, departmental  boards 
would prepare business plans, defining priorities and key outcomes  putting into effect the 
broad policy priorities of Government, within tight financial controls imposed by the 
Treasury. The new era would be one of ‘delegated authority’, involving a focus on 
outcomes rather than processes, a set of strategic boundaries within which individual civil 
servants could display their capacity for ‘inventiveness’ and professional discretion 
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(Maude, 2009b). For the first time full use would be made of key agents of expertise in the 
deliberations of the boards: that of the departmental financial manager and of the non 
executive member, now to be drawn predominantly from the business interest. He or she 
would now be a key agent supplying the necessary strategic expertise and with significant 
powers in respect of another key agent in the new management process: the Departmental 
Permanent Secretary. In effect this would mean the power to recommend dismissal to the 
Head of the Civil Service (Maude, 2009b) in the event of failure to implement his or her 
mandate.   
 
Henceforward,  there was to be a new ‘fiduciary responsibility’ to the taxpayer imposed on 
senior officials (Maude, 2009a). Notions of the ‘good citizen’ favoured by Conservatives 
in the 1980s and 1990s (Cooper, 1998) – the idea of the ‘citizen taxpayer’ – were thus 
taken up and put to new use. The imputation of  common ‘taxpayer’ interest was  now 
being used as a means of legitimising a particular notion of the public good: privileging  
cost efficiency and business like practices. ‘Post bureaucracy’, as the Conservatives saw it, 
required not only a new autonomy for civil servants, but an increasing level of 
transparency in the availability of information. Opening up to public and media scrutiny an 
array of new information, including the salaries of senior civil servants, all items of major 
spending, organisational structures and job descriptions, would impose its own subtle 
discipline on the activities of  civil servants at all levels.  
 
But if Conservatives were borrowing from  think tanks and the other sources we have been 
considering, they were also adapting ideas and practices with a longer history. Key 
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elements in the Conservative schemes suggested an attempt to refine the familiar 
technologies of performance related pay (Marsden and French, 2002). Henceforward there 
would be financial performance targets for board members and additional rewards for 
those suggesting cost savings. The techniques of performance appraisal and the 
management of incentives would allow for the proper reward of efficiency, with 
departments able to demonstrate cost savings duly rewarded.  
 
A ‘conservative revival’ ?  
As Conservatives developed their programmes of rule during the middle years of the first 
decade of the new millennium, certain commentators on the British left (Cruddas and 
Rutherford, 2007) reflected on what they saw as  a new era of  political creativity on the 
right. The sterility of the left, as they saw it, contrasted with  Conservatives busy 
reinventing their own tradition. With the revival of sceptical modes of argumentation, 
arguments  in favour of the customary wisdom of civil servants and images of a new civic 
service, it is not difficult to see how the developments we have been exploring might have 
been taken for a significant  moment of conservative political inventiveness. Yet, as the 
preceding discussion has implied, to focus on a ‘revival’ of Burkean  conservative 
discourse in the 2000s would be  misleading. Such developments, we would argue, should 
be seen as of secondary significance in relation to another mode of political discourse, 
fundamentally managerial in orientation, that informed the interventions of Conservatives 
during these years.  
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During the years of ‘New Labour’, certain academics argued that the era of the ‘new 
public management’ had passed (Jones, 2001; Osborne, 2006). Political authorities, they 
said, now favoured methods of ‘partnership’ and enhanced ‘flexibility’ in the delivery of 
services. Yet, as we have seen, interest in the deployment of practices drawn from the 
domain of enterprise did not diminish during these years, even if political authorities 
sought to enrol new ‘partners’. The developments we have been reviewing suggest a 
further moment of inventiveness in the deployment of practices borrowed from the domain 
of enterprise in the offices of  the State. The ‘new public management’, as others have 
argued (Lapsley, 2008), is best viewed not as a constant or fixed doctrine but as a loose 
configuration of ideas and practices. It is open to differing interpretation, change and 
revision in the light of shifting political circumstances and operational requirements. ‘New 
Labour’  turned to the technology of the board to enhance ‘delivery’ and to correct what it 
took to be the overly narrow focus of the managerial innovations of the Thatcher and 
Major eras. In turn, liberal conservatives looked to modified departmental ‘governance’ 
arrangements in developing their scheme of rule, seeking to resolve what they portrayed as 
the excesses and perverse effects of the years of ‘New Labour’, as part of an effort to 
modernise management in the Civil Service.  
 
There are parallels here, we would argue, with the earlier experience of the NPM under the 
Conservatives. Certainly, Conservative schemes in the new millennium exhibited a 
coherence of form uncharacteristic of the early years of the NPM in Britain (Hood, 1991). 
But during the 2000s, matters of efficiency became the preeminent concern of 
Conservatives just as they had been in the early years of the leadership of Margaret 
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Thatcher. Conservatives revisited the ideal of the ‘citizen taxpayer’ and the tactics of 
performance pay, revising and refining their favoured practices of government. Once again, 
the intellectual resources of think tanks played their part in conjunction with other political 
forces. The IEA with its objectives for the long term transformation of intellectual life 
(Cockett, 1995) can be differentiated from the more engaged and policy oriented practice 
of Policy Exchange or the Institute for Government. But in each instance,  similar 
‘intellectual’ force, ‘dealers in ideas’, removed from the domain of formal parliamentary 
politics, yet ultimately seeking to influence that domain by articulating the truth of 
political life, were involved.  
 
We would also argue that the Conservative scheme of the new millennium suggests an 
array of costs and difficulties similar in kind to those associated with an earlier 
Conservative era of reform in the Civil Service (du Gay, 2000; Hood, 1991; Pollitt, 1993). 
The Conservative scheme of the new millennium sought to define the senior civil servant 
primarily as a manager and specifically as a strategic planner. Less an independent voice 
licensed to speak frankly to  political authorities (du Gay, 2009), the senior civil servant 
was now to be encouraged to define himself or herself as an agent of the collective 
decision making processes of the board. And he or she was to be rewarded for the 
achievement of politically determined priorities. At issue here is the customary role of the 
senior civil servant in counselling  a minister against unwise and short term policy 
measures, a type of frank speaking that could extend to reminding a minister of the 
requirement  to deal openly and honestly with Parliament (Marquand, 2004). More 
generally, there is the question of the ‘tradition’ of impartiality and independence in the 
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Civil Service that has underpinned a particular parliamentary democratic regime. The 
Northcote Trevelyan report of 1853 fashioned a distinctive identity for the ‘new senior 
class’ (du Gay, 2009; Barratt, 2009). Senior civil servants were to advise, assist and ‘to 
some extent influence those who are from time to time set over them’ ( PP 1854, p.2 ). 
Practices of recruitment, development and promotion were to be overseen by an 
independent Civil Service Commission with the aim of nurturing the  necessary virtues and 
intellectual capabilities. For all the talk of protecting custom, Conservative showed little 
concern for the potential consequences of their scheme for the idea of a politically 
impartial and independent Civil Service.  
  
Conservatives in the 2000s imagined a distinctive configuration of relations between the 
subjects of the board. The ‘non – executive’ board member, political appointees working at 
the heart of the administration and drawn primarily from the business interest, would not 
only supply the necessary strategic guidance and know how but play a part in determining 
the fate of the senior civil servant. Civil servants unable to demonstrate the necessary 
commitment to political priorities would now be at risk of replacement on the 
recommendation of  the ‘non  - executives’. Conservative reforms in this regard suggest an 
extension of the ‘post democratic’ characteristics of the NPM (Crouch, 2004), a further 
way of extending the direct influence of representatives of corporate interests, with their 
privileged knowledge, into the offices of government.  And if the board truly was to hold 
collective responsibility for its decisions, the question of political accountability would 
inevitably arise. Contrary to accepted convention, a minister would  no longer be 
accountable to Parliament for key decisions in his or her department (du Gay, 2000).   
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Those who claim to draw inspiration from the thought of Burke and Oakeshott  appeared 
indifferent to the fundamental constitutional issues at stake in their chosen measures. 
 
Conservatives promised a new era of ‘freedom’ in the working lives of individual civil 
servants. ‘New Labour’, it was argued, had acted illiberally.  The subjects of the strategic 
management plans of the boards -  individual civil servants -  were to be licensed to act 
without the constraining process targets of ‘New Labour’, focusing on ‘outcomes’. With 
the Conservatives, then, there was to be a new ‘responsibilisation’ of the civil servant at 
lower levels of the organisation. The ideal of ‘government at a distance’ (Rose, 1999) was 
thus  taking another turn. But in effect, a weighty responsibility was to be assigned to civil 
servants: the ‘problem’ of finding ways to manage the deficit in the public finances. And 
with such delegation would appear to come  certain risks. The proposed  regime of 
empowerment and incentives would appear to offer  much in the way of encouragement 
for the cutting of corners, a zealousness and lack of restraint in the performance of the 
work of the State. As critics of the earlier era of Conservative innovation in the Civil 
Service argued, a value system that ‘licensed greed’ nourishes the conditions of corruption 
and jobbery (Phillips, 1988; Doig, 1997). The Conservative scheme of the 2000s envisaged 
not only new forms of empowerment and incentives but a new era of competition in the 
Civil Service, involving additional opportunities for private enterprises, cooperatives and 
other ‘civil society’ organisations to compete over government contracts. Delegation 
would require an enhanced role for civil servants in the negotiation and management of 
contracts. Conservatives appeared unconcerned with the risks to the public in this state of 
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affairs, of the need for ‘strategies’ for the enhancement of probity and honest 
administration (Doig, 1997) in a decentralised regime. 
 
Values of integrity and impartiality, customarily associated with the defence of the public 
interest, would seem to be at risk in the new disaggregated and incentivised regime of the 
Conservative ‘modernizers’. Under ‘New Labour’ ministers merely monitored and 
oversaw the work of departmental boards. By contrast, the Conservatives of the new 
millennium sought to bring ministers to the centre of departmental management, leading 
their boards.   But as the powers of ministers in respect of their departments were to be 
framed in strategic managerial terms, so the political control of  departments would seem 
to be effectively weakened. As in the operation of the boards, delegation could all too 
easily be used as a device by ministers for reallocating responsibility to others in the event 
of failure (du Gay, 2000). 
 
The single minded pursuit of frugal government in the years of the Thatcher and Major 
governments was associated with a notable decline in morale in the Civil Service 
(Hennessy, 1989). The pursuit of economy encouraged an array of responses at this time. 
The growing use of ‘casual workers’, ‘downsizing’ and the intensification of work became 
part of the everyday experience of the civil servant (Fairbrother, 1994). Civil servants 
came to appreciate that whilst expected to contribute more in the way of effort, they should 
expect much less from their employer in return (Driscoll and Morris, 2001; Fairbrother, 
1994;Foster and Hoggett, 1999). They learnt also that freed from bureaucratic ’constraints’ 
and empowered with responsibility for the management of performance and rewards, their 
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managers were all too commonly inclined to act in arbitrary ways (Marsden and French, 
2002).  The divisive and ineffective nature of target based regimes became all too familiar. 
The phenomenon of ‘targetology’ was discovered during these years: the tendency for 
target based systems to focus on more readily measurable outcomes (Rouse, 1993). Users 
of such systems were inclined to ‘gaming’ (Pollitt, 1989), to outright distortion in the 
reporting of outcomes. If Conservative schemes underscored the ideal of enriching the 
working lives of civil servants alongside the promotion of enhanced efficiency in the 
offices of government, the experience of an earlier era of Conservative rule in the Civil 
Service suggested the profound difficulties associated with any project of this kind.  
 
Conservatives, then, showed little inclination to reflect critically on or learn from 
experience. Suggesting a further dilution of accountability in the Civil Service, a 
bureaucracy more ‘self interested’, politically partial and potentially less effective in its 
working, our evaluation of the Conservatives’ scheme for the government of civil servants 
appears to raise a number of fundamental and familiar problems. And ultimately, just as  
critics of an earlier era of management reform argued (Marquand, 2004; Crouch, 2004), 
there is a question of public confidence in the political process at stake in this scheme. 
Trust in the operation of government and the central administrative apparatus, as David 
Marquand (2004) has argued, is a precondition of such forms of citizen participation as the 
British version of parliamentary democracy allows. Without such trust, democratic 
citizenship - already weakened (Marquand, 2004) -  must atrophy still further. 
Conservatives appeared indifferent to such potentially profound  ramifications of their 
scheme.  
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Conclusion 
Stuart Hall (2011) has recently suggested that the leadership of the contemporary 
Conservative party  is the best prepared and most radical of the political regimes which 
since the 1970’s have been maturing the neo – liberal project in Britain. Our particular 
example of the emergence of the technology of the board as a key target for action and 
intervention during the early years of the new millennium appears consistent with Hall’s 
general claim for the preparedness of the Conservatives. We would differ from him 
however in emphasizing the complexity of the processes by which this scheme took shape. 
Deriving from abstract political arguments and the development of more specific 
programmes and technologies of rule, we have emphasized the role of a dispersed array of 
governmental authorities and forces in the fashioning of a distinctive rationality of 
government  and a particular technology of power. 
 
Though we have sought to avoid abstract and general characterisation of ‘neo – liberal’ 
rule, our example of the boards of the Civil service would endorse Hall’s claim for the 
continuing dominance of this logic. The domain of ‘enterprise’ was not only to be 
protected to the utmost from the burdens of the State but also, through plans for the 
deployment of the technology of the board, ‘enterprise’ became an essential source for 
refashioning the organisation of the offices of government and the norms of behaviour 
which were to apply to it. The boards of departments became a key device for addressing 
an array of political and economic problems. Yet we have also tried to capture the hybrid 
nature of this particular governmental scheme. Arguments with a conservative lineage 
stand in a secondary or subordinate relationship to a managerialist and ultimately neo 
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liberal logic. Conservatives returned to sceptical and Burkean lines of argument to fashion 
a critique of the regime of targets, central monitoring and audit in the Civil Service. They 
praised the customs of the Civil Service, imagining a newly moralised civil servant. Yet, 
from the outset, the aim was to encourage a new era of ‘modern management’ in the Civil 
Service. Ultimately, there was an affirmation of the salience of technologies borrowed 
from the domain of the business enterprise. Liberal conservatives celebrated principles of 
enterprise in a way that sat uncomfortably with the sceptical, self critical and provisional 
elements in conservative discourse. Were they to have reflected in this way, we have 
suggested, they would have found serious grounds for concern in their preferred scheme 
for the government of civil servants.  
 
We have stopped short of examining the moment of implementation of the Conservative 
scheme for the boards. There is, of course, always the possibility that their scheme of rule 
might ultimately prove to be of little consequence, running aground, for example, on 
resistance or practical difficulties encountered by the non executives (Ferlie et al, 1996). 
Administration and ‘strategy’ might, in practice,  proceed without the influence of the 
board. Here, exploring the emergence of the board as a technology of government and the 
rationality of government to which it is connected, we have highlighted an array of 
potential costs, taking the Conservatives and their plans for government seriously. We 
would argue that Conservatives showed little inclination to reflect critically on or learn 
from the errors of the recent past.  In so far as the Conservative scheme appears to 
diminish political accountability and to promote a more ‘self interested’ and politically 
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partial administration, we have suggested that ultimately it is parliamentary democracy 
itself that can be seen to be at risk in these developments.  
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